From Sallah ud din to Netanyahu: How the Syrian Druze Became Targets in the Name of 'Protection'

 

The Druze community has once again found itself at the center of conflict and controversy in Syria, as recent clashes erupted in the southern areas of Damascus, particularly in Jarmana and Sahnaya. These areas, known strongholds of the Druze, became flashpoints following a surge of incitement and hate speech on social media, according to the Syrian Interior Ministry. These violent episodes led to the deaths and injuries of several individuals, including security personnel. Amid the turmoil, Israel carried out airstrikes in Sahnaya, claiming it targeted individuals planning to attack the Druze community. The Israeli government reiterated its historical commitment to protect the Druze, pointing to longstanding connections between Israeli citizens and the Syrian Druze. This message followed a rare religious visit in March 2025 by prominent Syrian Druze figures to the occupied Golan Heights, where they met with Sheikh Aql Mawfaq Tarif, the spiritual leader of the Druze. This visit was unprecedented and marked a significant symbolic gesture.

With the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, a period of uncertainty has opened for the Druze community in Syria. Questions surrounding their future have deepened as Israel’s claimed protective actions, such as military intervention in Druze-populated regions, stirred tensions. The Druze, or 'Muhaddithun'—believers in one God—trace their name to Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Druzi and are also known as ‘Banu Ma’ruf’. They are a monotheistic minority with a strong presence in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. In Syria, they have historically played vital roles in the country’s military and political landscape, standing alongside forces in the Battle of Hattin and Ain Jalut, and resisting various invaders through centuries. Their alliance shifted over time, supporting the Ottomans against Egyptian forces in the 19th century, before eventually revolting against Ottoman control.

During the early 20th century, the Druze lent their support to Sharif Hussein, and Sultan Pasha al-Atrash led them through the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 against French rule, rejecting the idea of a Druze state and advocating for Syrian independence. Today, the Druze number around 700,000 in Syria, concentrated in Sweida, the Golan Heights, Idlib, and around Damascus. The Druze leadership includes respected spiritual figures like Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri, Sheikh Hamoud Al-Hinawi, and Sheikh Yusuf Jarbou. The first two have remained largely neutral or opposed to the government at various times, while the latter is a known supporter of the state. On the militant front, Sheikh Laith Al-Balous leads the ‘Quwat Al-Karama’ group, founded by his father, the late Sheikh Wahid Al-Balous, who was a vocal critic of Assad and died in a suspicious 2015 car bombing.

Throughout the Syrian conflict that began in 2011, most of the Druze community sought to avoid taking sides. However, this changed in 2015 when extremist factions advanced into southern Syria, prompting Druze fighters to defend their areas. In Sweida, Druze youth faced forced military conscription, but local resistance led to an agreement that limited their service to their home province. Attacks from ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra further compelled local Druze militias to arm themselves for self-defense. In 2018, Sweida suffered one of the worst attacks when ISIS militants killed over 200 people. By 2023, as the broader war de-escalated, protests erupted in Sweida demanding Assad’s removal. Religious leaders, except Sheikh Yusuf al-Jarbou, backed the protests. Demonstrations centered around Al-Karama Square, near the shrine of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, a symbol of the community’s resistance legacy.

In Idlib, tensions between Druze villagers and Jabhat al-Nusra escalated in 2014, culminating in a massacre in Qalb Luza. The group apologized and blamed rogue fighters, but reports by organizations like Truth and Justice for Syria documented continued abuses, including kidnappings, harassment, and property seizures. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which evolved from Jabhat al-Nusra, currently controls areas in Jabal al-Summaq, where 14 Druze villages remain under constant pressure. In a public relations move, HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani met with Druze elders in 2022, promising justice and peace. Despite the gestures, trust remained fragile, especially with violence escalating again in Druze-populated regions like Jarmana.

The collapse of the Assad regime in late 2024 brought Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to the forefront of the new Syrian government, now led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Muhammad al-Julani). This development alarmed many in the Druze community, given HTS's violent history in Sweida and Idlib. Nevertheless, contact was quickly established between the Druze leadership and the interim government. Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, in a January interview, appealed for dialogue to stabilize Syria’s future. In a December meeting with Druze delegates, al-Sharaa emphasized unity and proposed a social contract to avoid sectarian fragmentation. Still, armed clashes erupted in March between Druze militias and government security in Jarmana, fueled by long-standing grievances and fresh tensions.

Events in coastal regions, where massacres of Alawite civilians reportedly occurred, prompted Sheikh al-Hijri to denounce what he termed "systematic killings." These developments deepened the Druze's concerns about Syria's transitional period and the stability of its sectarian fabric. Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, citing threats from HTS and the new Syrian army, demanded a demilitarized zone in Druze-majority areas such as Quneitra, Daraa, and Sweida. His remarks triggered widespread protests in Syria, with demonstrators rejecting foreign interference. Shortly afterward, interim president al-Sharaa reassured Druze leaders of their integral role in Syria’s future. A March 16 policy by Israel further inflamed matters, granting work permits to Syrian Druze in the Golan Heights. While some welcomed the gesture, many viewed it as part of a broader strategy to influence internal Syrian affairs.

Despite Israel’s stated intention to protect the Druze, demonstrations in Damascus and Sweida accused Tel Aviv of exploiting the sect's vulnerability. During this fraught moment, key figures from Druze armed groups such as ‘Forces of Dignity’ and ‘Ahrar al-Jabal’ met with the interim Syrian government. Al-Sharaa stressed that Sweida would remain part of a united Syria, rejecting secession or foreign control. As Syria navigates this volatile post-Assad phase, the Druze community faces a complex reality—balancing its tradition of self-reliance, religious cohesion, and political engagement amid new power dynamics and external pressures. Their future now hinges on the fragile dialogue with the new government and the preservation of their autonomy in a changing nation.